




As in most other countries, the approach to sovereign immunity in Italy has
developed gradually. The original doctrine of absolute immunity has slowly
been eroded as the courts recognized that the complex of government activities
made it impossible for an absolute rule to prevail, and that a distinction must be
made between public acts (jure imperil) and private acts (jure gestionis).
Surprisingly, in Italy, which is a civil law country, transition from absolute to
restrictive immunity has been made by the courts rather than by statutory enact-
ment. 1 Indeed, the determination of whether a foreign sovereign is entitled to
immunity from the jurisdiction of the Italian courts can be made only by the
judiciary. If a foreign sovereign wants to raise the defense, it must do so in
court, and there is no procedure for obtaining recommendations from the
Italian Foreign Ministry similar to that whereby foreign governments obtain
"suggestions of immunity" from the United States Department of State.
Indeed, it would be considered improper for the Foreign Ministry to interfere
with the functions of the judicial branch. When it comes to execution on a
judgment or the use of provisional remedies, however, the Italian Ministry of
Justice can become involved in the determination of immunity.
From the beginning of this century, Italian courts have followed the theory of
restrictive immunity although their pronouncements have not been necessarily
consistent, at the same or different times, as to what should be regarded as
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public acts or private acts. The courts exempt from their jurisdiction acts of
foreign states which are performed in their sovereign capacity in Italy as well as
acts which arejus imperii under the foreign state's own legal system, and have
taken place within the confines of the foreign territory (a concept similar to the
"act-of-state" doctrine recognized by American courts). No exemption is
recognized, however, when the foreign state acts independently of its sovereign
power in the performance of an activity which could be performed by a private
individual subject to the jurisdiction of the forum.2
Italian court precedents, although not unanimous in formulating the basis for
the theory of sovereign immunity, have often based the decision on a customary
general principle of international law which "exempts from jurisdiction foreign
states for acts which remain extraneous to the jurisdiction of the state of the
forum." The Court of Cassation, in a decision rendered in 1960,' held that a
state operating in the territory of another state, within the framework of its
sovereign power may not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the state of the
forum because of the principle of the equality and independence of all states
(pari in parem non habet imperium). But if the state acts independently of its
sovereign power, as if it were a private individual, it is subjected to the juris-
diction because it is acting as a citizen of the forum state.
This concept of a duality of the state as both a political entity and a civil entity
reflects on the international level and the approach of the Italian legal system to
the problem of the amenability of the Italian state and its subdivisions to the
national courts. The analogy was pointedly made, back in 1926, by the Court of
Cassation when it noted that the state, although essentially an entity of public
law, is also an entity of private law. In fact, one could not conceive of a human
association, with political autonomy and sovereignty, which does not also have
and exercise, in the realm of private law, the power to engage in an activity
capable of legal effects. This, the court said, is true both under the internal law
of the state and under international law. 4 Other more recent decisions refer to
the "now well accepted principle which, although admitting the idea of unity
and indivisibility of the State, distinguishes between the public law and the
private law capacity of the State." In making this distinction, the judges make
reference first of all to the position of the Italian state in its own courts and
2See Campione v. Peti Nitrogenmuvek and Hungarian Popular Republic, Court of Cassation,
Decision No. 3368 of November 14, 1972 in RIvISTA DI DsRirro INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PRO-
CESSUALE 1974, page 101 at 105.
3Decision No. 1919 of July 14, 1960, Pontificio Istituto Ecclesiastico Ungherese v. Accademia di
Ungheria in Roma, Giustizia Civile, I, 342.
4Court of Cassation, Decision No. 720 of March 13, 1926, State of Rumania v. Trutta, RIVISTA
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 1926, 252.
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apply then the distinction, by analogy, to the position of foreign states before
the Italian courts.5
The classification of public acts and private acts has led the court to distinc-
tions which are often extremely subtle because there is no common test by which
the various legal systems may decide whether various state acts are
governmental (i.e., public) or commercial (i.e., private) in nature. The increase
in the number of collectivistic states in the last fifty years and the resulting
participation by such states in commercial activities has added to the problem.
The Italian Court of Cassation, in a decision rendered in 1953, stated that the
assumption of all economic activities by a collectivistic state does, in fact,
enlarge its competence and functions but does not, in itself, modify the concept
of its sovereign power in the traditional political sense of supreme function as
imperium. 6
We shall hereafter consider the way in which Italian courts have resolved
some of the questions which often arise in matters of sovereign immunity
involving acts of nationalization, immunity of state trade organizations or other
foreign public entities.
In the case of Campione v. Peti Nitrogenmuvek and Popular Republic of
Hungary, ' the Court of Cassation was faced with a request for immunity raised
by Hungary in a suit started by an Italian firm which claimed that it was
damaged by a nationalization act adopted by the Hungarian Republic. In 1947,
the Italian firm, Campione, had signed a contract with an Hungarian private
firm, Peti, for the supply of sulphur in exchange for turpentine. While the
Italian company performed, it never received the consideration. In 1948, the
firm Peti was nationalized and in 1952 the Italian firm started a suit in Italy to
recover damages for breach of contract. At the time the action was initiated,
Peti was a governmental entity with its own legal personality and the Hungarian
government a guarantor of the obligation of the entity. In 1959, while the suit
was still pending, a new Hungarian law limited the responsibility of state
entities for their obligations to the assets assigned to them and eliminated the
state guarantee ex tunc. The Italian plaintiff argued that as the result of the
nationalization decree the Hungarian state had become the owner of Peti and it
had an exclusive and absolute interest in the company and was therefore fully
'Castiglioni v. Jugoslavia Federal Popular Republic, Decision of the Tribunal of Rome on January
28. 1952. Foro Italiano, 1952, I, 796; Court of Cassation, Decision No. 1631 of September 21,
1947, Government of Bolivia v. Consorzio Italiano Esportazione Aeronautiche, Foro Italiano
1949, 1, 460; R. LUZZATTO, STATI STRANIERI E GIURISDIZIONE NAZIONALE, Milano 1972 at 281.
6Borga v. Commercial Delegation of the U.S.S.R. Decision No. 2742 of August 14, 1953, Giuris-
prudenza Italiana, 1954, 1, 1, 440.
'Decision No. 3368 of November 14, 1972, RIVISTA Di DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E
PROCESSUALE, 1974, 101.
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responsible for its obligations. What the plaintiff asked the court to do was in
effect to recognize a responsibility of the Hungarian state on an extra-contrac-
tual basis not on the strength of its own national laws but on those of the forum.
The Italian court was asked to stand in judgment over the Hungarian
nationalization policy to determine whether the laws enacted had caused
damage to an Italian citizen by modifying the private rights and obligations of
the nationalized firm.
The Court of Cassation reiterated its adherence to the restrictive theory of
immunity and stated that trading states, although enlarging their sphere of
action, are not exempt from the jurisdiction of Italian courts except for those
acts which are strictly an exercise of their sovereign power. The court held that
in the case of nationalization, the legislation of the nationalizing government
controlled as an expression of sovereignty effectively exercised, and declined
jurisdiction over the Hungarian state. Any different approach, the court held,
would result in impermissible review of the acts of a foreign government within
its own legal system.
In another case the Italian courts were presented with the question of whether
the U.S.S.R. could be subject to the jurisdiction of Italian courts through its
commercial representative office in Italy, for controversies arising from
contracts entered into by the representative office. In its decision in the case of
Borga v. Representative Office of the U.S.S.R. the Court of Cassation8
confirmed that the U.S.S.R. was not exempt from suit in Italy. By carrying out
in Italy a trading activity which could be performed by a private person, it
divested itself of its public personality and could not raise the defense of
sovereign immunity. The court pointed out that the principle of reciprocal
equality and independence of states is not violated by subjecting to the juris-
diction of the court a foreign state for acts of a private nature. When a foreign
state exercises in the territory of another an activity which any citizen of that
country can perform, that government is without the attributes of supremacy
and public power. It acts just as the Italian state would when, in order to reach
certain commercial goals, it enters into a contractual relationship with a private
person. As the Italian state would be answerable in its own courts for any breach
of its contractual obligations, the same principle was held to apply to a foreign
sovereign trading in Italy through its commercial representative office.
In a 1963 case against the United States government, the Court of Cassation
held a contract entered into by the United States Military base in Leghorn with
an Italian firm to be a private act not covered by sovereign immunity. The
contract was for the construction of a sewer system for the military base. The
'Decision No. 2742 of August 14, 1953 in Giurisprudenza Italiana 1954, I, 440.
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court rejected the United States government's argument that in view of the
public function of the military activity, any act performed by the military
administration of the foreign sovereign in Italy must be considered jure imperii.
The court decided that when a foreign sovereign enters into a commercial
contract with a private Italian citizen it performs a private act which is not
covered by sovereign immunity.'
In cases involving commercial transactions of a buying-selling type, the
delimitation of private acts is relatively easy. More difficult is the classification
of acts growing out of the internal administration of the foreign delegation.
In the case of Russian Trade Delegation v. Kazmann, the Court of Cassation1 °
held in 1933 that the internal administration of the delegation and acts in
pursuance thereof were of a public nature and consequently not subject to the
jurisdiction of Italian courts.
Since 1933, a number of cases have determined what acts of internal admini-
stration of foreign delegations and representative offices should be considered of
a private and which of a public nature. Of particular interest are the cases
arising from controversies over the employment relationship with the personnel
of such delegations.
In a case decided in 1971 by the Court of Cassation, 1 an employee of the
United States Information Service office in Naples sued the government of the
United States claiming certain fringe benefits to which she would have been
entitled under Italian labor law. The court recognized that the controversy,
although involving an employment relationship, was not one over which Italian
courts could exercise jurisdiction. The government of the United States was held
to be entitled to immunity because the employment in question was a public act,
jure imperii. The employee, although admitting that the United States
Information Service was exercising a public function of the United States, had
insisted that her functions in the United States Information Service library were
of a modest and occasional nature and that her employment was to be
considered a private act of the United States government. The court rejected
this argument and, in analyzing the employee's functions as an "assistant
librarian," pointed out that she participated effectively in that public activity of
propaganda and information abroad which was the function of the United States
Information Service as an expression of the sovereignty of the United States.
'Decision No. 1178 of May 13, 1963, United States Government v. Societa' I.R.S.A., Foro
Italiano, 1963, I, 1405.
"Decision No. 206 of January 18, 1933, Foro Italiano 1933, 1, 1520.
"Decision No. 3441 of November 25, 1971, De Ritis v. Government of the United States of
America, Foro Italiano, 197, I, 2181.
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The Court of Cassation distinguished the facts from those of two other cases it
had decided some few years before where it held that the employment
relationship was to be classified as a private act not exempt from the jurisdiction
of Italian courts. One case involved the employment by the United States Army
Southern European Task Force Military Post of Vicenza of a kitchen worker. 2
The court admitted that the organization performed activities of a sovereign
nature, but decided that the exemption from Italian jurisdiction did not extend
to employment contracts entered into by the sovereign entity with private
individuals, where the nature of the employment did not involve sovereignty.
Menial activity of a kitchen worker, "even though his activity served to provide
the means and the service utilized to perform the functions typical of the
N.A.T.O. organs," fell into this category. In the second case, decided in 1959,
the court held that sovereign immunity could not be claimed in the case of an
employment contract involving a worker in the mess hall of a Venezuelan naval
mission. I3
Even in the absence of immunity from suit, there may be immunity of the
foreign sovereign's property from seizure by Italian courts. Law No. 1263 of July
15, 1926, provides, for instance, that, subject to reciprocity, no measures of
execution nor preventive measures can be levied upon the property of foreign
sovereigns without obtaining the prior authorization of the Ministry of Justice.
In practical effect, if one of these measures is requested of a judge, he will
proceed to apply the measure without any limitation, until and unless a request
for relief is made to the ministry and the existence of reciprocity is ascertained
and declared by ministerial decree. In order to issue a decree, the ministry must
determine that under the legal system of the foreign state there is reciprocity
with respect to execution or preventive measures against similar property
belonging to the Italian state. A ministerial decree regarding the existence of
reciprocity with one particular foreign state does not have general character but
relates only to the specific case under consideration. If another case should arise
concerning the same foreign state, it is the practice of the Ministry to make
another investigation, and if appropriate, issue another decree. The reciprocity
may exist at a certain period or relate to certain specific state property but may
not exist at a later date or relate to certain other state property. Once a decree is
issued which determines that reciprocity exists, the judge will refrain from any
execution or the approval of use of preventive measures against the property of
"
2 Court of Cassation, Decision No. 467 of March 2, 1964, United States Government v. Vasco
Bellotto, Foro Italiano 1965, 1, 913.
'Court of Cassation, Decision No. 3160 of October 28, 1959, Repertorio 1959, heading "Com-
petenza Civile" Nos. 40-42.
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the foreign state unless an authorization is specifically issued by the Ministry of
Justice. 14
The Italian Constitutional Court has determined that Law No. 1263 was not
in violation of Article 10 of the Constitution of 1946, which states that "the
Italian legal system must conform to the generally recognized rules of inter-
national law." Its ruling was based on the finding that in the legislation, juris-
prudence and treatises of the various countries there is no common approach, in
method or system, towards the matter of immunity from execution or the use of
preventive measures against property of foreign sovereigns, and therefore no
"generally recognized rule of international law" which could be violated. The
court did, however, find unconstitutional on other grounds the last paragraph
of Law No. 1263 which denied any possibility of appeal from a ministerial
decree. The provision was held to be in violation of Article 113 of the Constitu-
tion which assures review of administrative acts by the judiciary."
Conclusion
Italy has developed over the years a practical approach to the question of
sovereign immunity which distinguishes against public acts (Yure imperiO,
which are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, and private acts
(jure gestionis), which are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. In most
cases, the distinction between the two types of act is clear and there is no
difficulty in predicting the ultimate decision of the Italian court. In those cases
where the dividing line is indefinite, there are no hard and fast rules, and each
case is determined on the basis of its own facts.
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